The State of Utah v. William Christofferson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
The State of Utah v. William Christofferson : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James C. Bradshaw; Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Christofferson, No. 880612 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1393
. « l 
(J 
c 
K j 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. 
BRIEF 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint if f/Resp^hM 
v. 
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, 
Defendant/Appeal' 
Case No. 880612-CA 
Priority No. 2 
[BJTIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Theft, a 
class A misdemeanor, in vMilftifin of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 
as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, 
presiding. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
JOAN C. WATT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 state Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880612-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Theft, a 
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 
as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, 
presiding. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
JOAN C. WATT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY ADMITTING WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON'S 
APRIL 7 STATEMENT TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF HIS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. . . 
A. MR. CHRISTOFFERSON INVOKED HIS RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL 
i. Mr. Christofferson Invoked His 
Right To Counsel When He Appeared In 
Circuit Court. 
ii. Even If Mr. Christofferson Did 
Not Invoke His Right To Counsel When 
He Appeared In Court On The Edison 
School Charge, He Nevertheless Invoked 
The Right When He Made An Equivocal 
Request For Counsel Which Was Ignored 
By The Officers Interrogating Him." . 
B. AFTER MR. CHRISTOFFERSON INVOKED HIS 
RIGHT TO THE PRESENCE OF AN ATTORNEY, HE 
NEITHER INITIATED FURTHER CONVERSATION 
NOR WAIVED THESE PREVIOUSLY INVOKED RIGHTS. 
C. THE ADMISSION OF MR. CHRISTOFFERSON'S 
APRIL 7 STATEMENT WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT 
i 
Page 
POINT II. THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO 
DISCLOSE THE CONTENTS OF A POLICE INVESTIGATION 
WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL TO MR. CHRISTOFFERSON. 22 
A. THE PROSECUTION VIOLATED ITS 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO 
PROVIDE THIS EVIDENCE TO THE DEFENSE. 22 
B. MR. CHRISTOFFERSON REQUESTED RELIEF AS 
SOON AS THE DISCOVERY VIOLATION BECAME 
APPARENT 29 
CONCLUSION, 
C. THE DENIAL OF RELIEF FOR THE BREACH OF 
DISCOVERY CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. . . 31 
32 
Addendum A: 
Addendum B: 
Addendum C: 
Addendum D: 
Addendum E: 
Motion to Suppress 
Court's Ruling on Motion to Suppress 
Defendant's Motion for Discovery 
State's Response to Discovery Motion 
Argument and Ruling on Discovery Violation 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases Cited 
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 
(1988) 12 
Cervi v. Kemp, 855 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1988) . . . . 12 
Connecticut v. Barrett, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 828, 
93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987) 13 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) 7, 10, 12, 
18 
Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173 (Alaska App. 1985) . . 15, 16, 17, 
18 
Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978) . . . . 18, 19 
Michigan v. Jackson, U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 1404, 
89 L.Ed.2d 631 (19"8~6T 13 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 5, 6, 7, 
11, 14, 15, 
16, 17, 18, 
19, 20 
Ochoa v. State, 573 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978) . 18, 19 
Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536 (11th Cir. 1988) . . . 16, 20 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984) 6, 7, 8, 
14 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985) 23 
State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988) . . . 7, 8, 9, 
16 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 30, 
31, 32 
State v. Larson, 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (filed June 1, 
19891 . . 31 
iii 
Page 
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985) . . . . . . 6 
State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074 (Idaho 
App. 1983) 9, 15, 16, 
20 
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984) 23, 25 
State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (Utah 1986) 20 
State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49 (Utah 1981) 22, 25 
State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477 A.2d 1265 (1984) . 17, 19 
Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979). 9, 20 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) . . . . 23 
United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 
1984) 15, 16 
United States ex rel Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 
117 (7th Cir. 1987) 13 
United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 
1985) 15, 16 
United States v. Prestigiacomo, 540 F.Supp. 681 
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) 15 
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution 3, 4, 13, 
18 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution 3, 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(a) (1982) 3, 5, 22, 
28, 29, 30 
iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended), whereby a defendant in a district 
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in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
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jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16 provides in pertinent part: 
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tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate 
the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree 
of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) Any other item of evidence which the 
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continuing duty to make disclosure. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880612-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-404 (1953 as amended). A jury convicted Mr. Christofferson 
after a trial held on August 11 and 12, 1988. On September 27, 
1988, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered judgment 
and conviction. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 5, 1988, William Christofferson was arrested and 
taken to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake City (R. 122 
at 2-3). In the early morning hours of April 6, Detective Hutchison 
"Mirandized" Mr. Christofferson, then interrogated him (jrd.) . The 
bulk of this interrogation concerned a burglary at the Edison School 
(R. 122 at 10). However, at the end of the conversation, 
Mr. Christofferson mentioned that he knew something about the theft 
of an air compressor in Murray (R. 122 at 11). After the interview, 
Mr. Christofferson was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail (R. 122 
at 4) . 
Sometime during April 6 or April 7, Mr. Christofferson 
went before a judge to determine if he should continue to be held in 
custody on the Edison School case (R. 122 at 14). He believed that 
the court appointed an attorney to represent him during that 
appearance (R. 122 at 7, 12 and 14). He remained in custody and the 
State filed charges in the Edison School case on April 8 (R. 122 at 
8). 
On April 7, while Mr. Christofferson was still being -held 
at the county jail, Detective Hutchison again informed 
Mr. Christofferson of his right to remain silent or to consult with 
an attorney (R. 122 at 9). Detective Christenson from Murray was 
not present during the reading and discussion of rights but later 
came in to interrogate Mr. Christof ferson (_I_d. ) . The sole topic of 
discussion in this second interrogation concerned the air compressor 
(R. 122 at 13). Sometime before the discussion of the air 
compressor, Mr. Christofferson indicated that he had been to court, 
had been appointed an attorney, and had not yet had an opportunity 
to talk to the attorney (R. 122 at 4-5). No one asked 
Mr. Christofferson if he wished to have his attorney present during 
the questioning on the air compressor (R. 122 at 7). On April 11, 
the State filed an Information charging Mr. Christofferson with 
Theft, a third degree felony, in the present case, the Murray air 
compressor case (R. 3, 21-22). 
Mr. Christofferson filed a Motion to Suppress the April 7 
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Christenson (R. 123 at 62-63). At trial, Detective Christenson 
testified that, during this April 27 conversation, the Defendant 
denied that he had taken part in the theft of the compressor, 
although he had planned it with another person (R. 123 at 63-64). 
Mr. Christofferson denied at trial that he had changed his story at 
all during the April 27 conversation (R. 123 at 87). 
Trial was held August 11 and 12, 1988 (R. 39-40). At 
trial, Mr. Christofferson renewed his Motion to Suppress his 
statement (R. 123 at 58-59). In addition, after Detective 
Christenson testified that the Defendant had changed his story 
between the first statement and trial, the Defendant objected that 
he had never been given this information by the prosecution (R. 123 
at 77). The trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
(R. 123 at 78-79). Mr. Christofferson testified at trial that he 
had taken the compressor as payment for work done for the victim for 
which the victim refused to pay him (R. 123 at 82-85). The jury 
found Mr. Christofferson guilty of Theft, a class A misdemeanor 
(R. 124 at 30). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting 
Mr. Christofferson's April 7 statement. The statement was taken in 
violation of his fifth amendment right to counsel. 
Mr. Christofferson invoked that right when he appeared in 
circuit court on the Edison School burglary charges and again when 
he made an ambiguous request by informing officers, after being 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY ADMITTING WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON'S 
APRIL 7 STATEMENT TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 3 8 4 IJ.S, 4 3 6 (19 6 6), the 
stated: 
[ T ] h e p r o s e c u t i o n in a y n o t u s e s t ate m e n t s w h e 11 i e i: 
e x c u l p a t o r y or i n c u l p a t o r y , stemming f rom 
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless i t 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against 
s e 1 f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n. 
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Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. These safeguards include a right to have 
an attorney present at any custodial interrogation. If the accused 
indicates in any manner and at any stage that he 
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking 
there can be no questioning. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
Although the accused may waive this right, 
the mere fact that he may have answered some 
questions or volunteered some statements on his 
own does not deprive him of the right to refrain 
from answering any further inquiries until he has 
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents 
to be questioned. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. Waiver will not be presumed from silence 
or simply from the fact that a confession was 
eventually obtained. 
Miranda, 384 U.S at 475. 
Thus, Miranda and its progeny created a rigid 
prophylactic rule embodying two distinct inquiries. Smith v. 
Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (citations omitted). 
First, courts must determine whether the accused 
actually invoked his right to counsel . . . 
Second, if the accused invoked his right to 
counsel, courts may admit his responses to further 
questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated 
further discussions with the police, and (b) 
knowingly and intelligently waived the right he 
had invoked. 
Smith, 469 U.S. at 95 (citations omitted). See also State v. Moore, 
697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985). 
The two inquiries must be kept separate; evidence of 
waiver may not be used in an attempt to show that no invocation of 
the right to counsel has been made by the accused. This is so 
b e c a m e of the bri-jlt . . * *- ?.]e set fortr : ^  Edward.; v, Arizona, 451 
- ... : request.; .. . . , .. * -.t 9b. Waiver cannot be 
established c\ t~ -;- j;p-e fac*- i-;-.i- *•"•=> .)-»*- wi . -^^ lined silent , 
v
 '^ t : . ' .j d t U J 1 
confession. Smith, 4 h 9 n.s, at 98; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
Therefore, 
[u ] s i i lg ar I a c c u s e d ' s subsequent responses to ca s t 
doubt on the adequacy of the initial request 
itse1£ is even more intolerable. No authority, 
and no'" logic, permits the interrogation to 
proceed . . , on his own terms and as if the 
defendant had requested nothing, in the hope that 
the defendant might be induced to say something 
casting retrospective doubt on his initial 
statement that he wished to speak through an 
a 11 o r n e y o r n o t a t a 11. 
Smith, 469 U.S. at 98-99 (citations omitted). 
A. ^ CHRISTOPFERSON INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO 
Where or rndividual makes ar •::, ambiguous request for 
counsel, ^e n — an absolute rir;- ' ' a, 
i- * i • .-.iiILt-d w i !" h hi,, ,: * .,. .;
 t Smit:. , 46^ , t *> . 
However, where the request is ambiguous, courts have taken three 
different approaches for determi n inq " f: lie ro nfipquencHM of sin 'h 
ci m b i g u J t. I e b , S i d l e v . G r i i t i n, '/ 5 4 P . .,' d '') 6 b , "^  6 8 {U t a h A p p , 
1 9 8 8 ) . In Griffin, this Court pointed out that,, in a footnote in 
Smith, the United fi^at^ Fmpr^m* ' <>in i~ • •«iinfn•.-* r i ;:'>j"'l these Uu^:' 
approaches *o an a:i ,^uw^o reque^* , v > t v u - iicrtjng any one of them: 
Soipt-' >/<, , - =>. nave neld m a t a] J quest . j rung must 
cease upon a:\y reqwes* - reference *o counsel, 
"7 
however equivocal or ambiguous. Others have 
attempted to define a threshold standard of 
clarity for such requests, and have held that 
requests falling below this threshold do not 
trigger the right to counsel. Still others have 
adopted a third approach, holding that when an 
accused makes an equivocal statement that 
"arguably" can be construed as a request for 
counsel, all interrogation must immediately cease 
except for narrow questions designed to "clarify" 
the earlier statement and the accused's desires 
respecting counsel. 
Griffin, 754 P.2d at 968; quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 96 n.3 
(citations omitted). 
This Court adopted the third or "clarification" approach 
outlined in Smith. 
If the request is clarified as a present desire 
for assistance of counsel, all questioning must 
cease as if an initial unambiguous request had 
been made. If, however, the accused, absent 
police persuasion, indicates he does not want 
counsel present at that time, the interrogation 
may continue. 
Griffin, 754 P.2d at 969. The Griffin Court found that the accused 
had made an arguably ambiguous request for counsel, when he said, 
"This is a lie. I'm going to talk to an attorney." I_d. The 
detective's response was found to be appropriate under the 
clarification approach: "OK, are you saying you don't want to talk 
any more?" Id. 
Griffin established that "when an accused makes an 
arguably equivocal request for counsel during a custodial 
interrogation, further inquiry must be limited to clarifying the 
request," 754 P.2d at 969. On its specific facts, this Court found 
that the appropriate clarification had taken place in Griffin. 
T
^
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interrogaticr. ;:.uJ". cease. Tnomcson, 60_L, F.2d at 771. The accused 
having expressed his desire to deal with the 
police only through counsel, is not subject to 
further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the 
accused himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police. 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). 
i. Mr. Christofferson Invoked His Right To 
Counsel When He Appeared in Circuit Court. 
Sometime on April 6 or 7, 1988, Mr. Christofferson 
apparently went before a circuit court judge on a school burglary 
case (R. 122 at 14). According to a transportation officer who 
testified for the State, the morning after an individual is booked 
into jail in Salt Lake County, the jail personnel transport that 
individual to circuit court, where he or she appears before a 
magistrate (R. 122 at 20). The purpose of the hearing is to 
determine whether probable cause to hold the person exists and to 
set bail. Id. 
While still in custody on April 7, after the hearing but 
before Mr. Christofferson had an opportunity to consult with counsel 
(R. 122 at 4-5), officers interrogated Mr. Christofferson concerning 
the theft of a compressor in the present case (R. 122 at 9 and 13). 
During the initial portion of that interrogation, Mr. Christofferson 
informed the officers that a lawyer had been appointed to represent 
him (R. 122 at 4-5). Detective Hutchison understood that 
Mr. Christofferson had seen a judge on the other case (R. 122 at 12) 
and that, although charges had not been filed on the other case, the 
judge had appointed a lawyer to represent Mr. Christofferson (R. 122 
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assistance—does not disappear simply because the 
police have approached the suspect, still in 
custody, still without counsel, about a separate 
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On April 7, 1988, Detective Hutchison approached 
Mr. Christofferson, who was being held in the Salt Lake County Jail, 
and read him the Miranda warnings (R. 122 at 9). After the warnings 
were read, Mr. Christofferson indicated that he had been to court, 
that an attorney had been appointed to assist in his defense, and 
that he had not yet talked with this attorney (R. 122 at 4-5). 
Detective Hutchison did not respond to this statement by asking if 
Mr. Christofferson wished to have that attorney present before 
answering any questions (R. 122 at 7). Instead, immediately after 
Mr. Christofferson's statement, Detective Christenson questioned 
Mr. Christofferson about the theft of an air compressor (R. 122 at 
13). 
As an initial matter, the trial court, in its Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, found that 
interrogation occurred while he 
[Mr. Christofferson] remained in continuous police 
custody 
(R. 34). Therefore, Miranda was implicated, and the trial court 
should have considered the invocation prong of the test announced in 
Smith. 469 U.S at 95. The trial court, in looking at the comments 
by Mr. Christofferson concerning the alleged appointment of counsel, 
focused on two areas. First, on April 7, no charges had been filed 
against Mr. Christofferson in either of the two cases, and, 
therefore, no sixth amendment right to counsel had attached 
(R. 34-35). Furthermore, the claim by Mr. Christofferson that 
counsel had been appointed "could not have possibly happened" 
(R. 35), which, in the eyes of the trial court, further damaged the 
sixth amendment claim. Second, under the fifth amendment, 
Mr. Christofferson had waived his rights under Miranda (R. 35). 
At no time did the trial court engage in the first step 
of the Miranda inquiry by looking at Mr. Christofferson's remarks 
concerning the appointment of counsel as a request for counsel's 
presence. The remarks were dismissed as being factually impossible, 
but this is irrelevant to the inquiry into invocation. It is not 
up to defendant to make some kind of formal 
request. The Miranda case does not impose such a 
requirement. A suspect may indicate his desire 
for counsel in any manner. 
United States v. Prestigiacomo, 540 F.Supp. 681, 684 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981). The trial court erred in jumping over this part of the two 
part test and immediately checking for a waiver of the right by the 
accused. 
Invocation and waiver are entirely distinct 
inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by 
merging them together, 
Smith, 469 U.S. at 98, or by ignoring one of them altogether. 
Often courts have found questions about the right to an 
attorney to be equivocal requests for counsel demanding immediate 
clarification or cessation of the interview. Examples of these 
include: "First of all how would I be able to get one, a lawyer?" 
Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1179 (Alaska App. 1985); "Why should 
I not get an attorney?" United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1130 
(5th Cir. 1984). Obvious examples of equivocal requests include: 
"Maybe I need an attorney," Moulds, 673 P.2d at 1083; or 
" . . . might want to talk to an attorney," United States v. Fouche, 
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776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985). 
Statements about the possibility of consulting an 
attorney have also been considered equivocal requests. Examples of 
these statements include: "I think I'll let you appoint me one," 
Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536, 538 (11th Cir. 1988); and "This is a 
lie. I'm going to talk to an attorney," Griffin, 754 P.2d at 968. 
Although Detective Hutchison did not testify as to the 
exact words used by Mr. Christofferson concerning the appointment of 
counsel, he clearly remembered the content of Mr. Christofferson1s 
remarks. The detective acknowledged that, prior to discussing the 
details of the two crimes, Mr. Christofferson indicated that he had 
been to court, that an attorney had been appointed to represent him, 
and that he had not yet consulted with that attorney (R. 122 at 4-5). 
At the very least, these remarks were an ambiguous 
request for counsel. The remarks concerned appointment of counsel 
and were similar to the inarticulately formed questions concerning 
such appointment that were asked in Cherry or Hampel. Furthermore, 
the remarks appear to be an ambiguous statement concerning the need 
for counsel similar to the statements in Owen or Griffin. Finally, 
as in Fouche and Moulds, Mr. Christofferson appears to have been 
wondering aloud if it would be wise for him to have his attorney 
present. 
Many defendants are not aware of the real scope of their 
Miranda rights. Furthermore, custodial interrogation can be very 
intimidating. Because of these two problems, an accused may not be 
capable of invoking the right to counsel in anything but a vague 
way. Here, the best Mr. Christofferson could do under the 
circumstance was to point out to the officer that counsel had been 
appointed. Because defendants cannot be expected to utter precisely 
the right phrases in such a situation and 
because the right to counsel is so fundamental, an 
equivocal request for an attorney is to be 
interpreted in the light most favorable to the 
defendant. 
State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477 A.2d 1265, 1268 (1984). If such 
requests are not clarified, 
only those who are most assertive and articulate 
would be capable of effectively exercising their 
fifth amendment rights. 
Hampel, 706 P.2d at 1180. 
Despite the remarks by Mr. Christofferson concerning the 
appointment of a lawyer to represent him, the officers did not 
attempt to clarify Mr. Christofferson's remarks (R. 122 at 7). 
Rather than clarifying the request, Detective Hutchison ignored it, 
and Detective Christenson asked Mr. Christofferson about the air 
compressor. These actions and omissions created a violation of 
Miranda, making the subsequent statement inadmissible. 
B. AFTER MR. CHRISTOFFERSON INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO 
THE PRESENCE OF AN ATTORNEY, HE NEITHER INITIATED 
FURTHER CONVERSATION NOR WAIVED THESE PREVIOUSLY 
INVOKED RIGHTS. 
The burden of proving "that the accused actually 
initiated the subsequent questioning11 is on the State. State v. 
Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477 A.2d 1265, 1270 (1984). 
Further, even if a conversation with the 
authorities is initiated by the accused subsequent 
to his request for counsel, the burden remains on 
the prosecution to demonstrate that there was, 
under the totality of the circumstances, a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of the fifth-amendment 
right to have counsel present during the 
interrogation. 
Wright, 477 A.2d at 1270; citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9. 
That burden becomes far more difficult, if not 
impossible, to sustain when the record shows that 
a request for counsel was made which was not 
honored before questioning continued. 
Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978). This is true, 
even when the request is arguably equivocal, because 
questioning must stop if the defendant indicates 
in any manner and at any stage of the process that 
he wishes to consult with an attorney before 
speaking. 
Id; quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added by the Sixth 
Circuit). 
The State has not met its burden in establishing waiver 
by the accused of his or her right to an attorney in a number of 
situations beyond ignoring an equivocal request for counsel. In 
Wright, the mere fact that the accused did not initiate the 
questioning by itself was enough to negate the State's showing. 477 
A.2d at 1271-72. If the only evidence of waiver is the fact of a 
subsequent confession, the State has not met its burden. Ochoa v. 
State, 573 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978). And, if the 
investigators attempt persuasion rather than clarification of the 
equivocal request, waiver has not been shown. Hampel v. State, 706 
P.2d 1173, 1182 (Alaska App. 1985). If the State does not meet its 
burden by proving both that the accused initiated the contact and 
that the accused waived his or her right to an attorney, the 
confession is not admissible. Ochoa, 573 S.W.2d at 801. 
The record does not establish that Mr. Christofferson 
initiated further conversations with officers after his remarks 
concerning counsel or that he waived such previously invoked 
rights. The record shows that Mr. Christofferson's request was 
ignored and that Detective Christenson immediately interrogated him 
(R. 122 at 7, 9-10). There is no evidence that Mr. Christofferson 
did anything more than assert his rights, then respond to further 
questioning. This does not constitute initiation of the 
conversation by the accused. 
Furthermore, the trial judge found that the State, not 
Mr. Christofferson, initiated the April 7 interrogation (R. 34). 
The only possible evidence of waiver in the record is the 
fact of the subsequent statement obtained by the accused responding 
to further questioning and the fact that he did not continue to 
insist on his right to the presence of counsel. This is not 
sufficient for the State to meet its "heavy burden" in proving a 
waiver of Miranda rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. In fact, once 
an equivocal request is ignored, the State's burden becomes almost 
impossible. Maglio, 580 F.2d at 205. Here, State initiation of the 
conversation is enough evidence to show that no waiver existed. 
Wright, 477 A.2d at 1271-72. And, the mere fact of the statement 
and lack of further assertion of the right is not enough to prove 
the existence of waiver in light of all the other evidence. 
Mr. Christofferson never waived his Miranda rights once he asserted 
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them. Hence, the April 7 statement was not admissible under the 
fifth amendment and the trial court erred in allowing the jury to 
hear it. 
C. THE ADMISSION OF MR. CHRISTOFFERSON'S APRIL 7 
STATEMENT WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
Admission of a confession taken in violation of Miranda 
requires reversal where the State cannot establish that the error 
was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Velarde, 734 
P.2d 440 (Utah 1986) . 
However, a determination that use of the 
suppressed statement constituted error does not 
end the inquiry. It is well established that the 
admission of statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda can be harmless error. Before federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, a court 
must "be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." In order to 
make this declaration, "it is necessary to review 
the facts of the case and the evidence adduced at 
trial to determine the effect of the challenged 
evidence "upon the other evidence adduced at trial 
and upon the conduct of the defense . . . " 
State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted). 
The Thompson Court found reversible error based on the 
use of the statement in the State's case-in-chief. 601 F.2d at 772; 
see also Moulds, 673 P.2d at 1085. In Owen, the Eleventh Circuit 
found the error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, when the 
admitted confession was the only direct evidence of intent in the 
case. 849 F.2d at 540-41. In addition, the admission of the 
statement was found to have "impacted 'upon the conduct of the 
defense,' by affecting the evidence that the defendant sought to 
admit." Id. 
In the present case, the State cannot establish that 
admission of Mr. Christofferson's April 7 statement was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The State put on three witnesses in its case-in-chief. 
Ben Chapman, a neighbor of the victim, knew only that the compressor 
was missing after he and the defendant had done some work for the 
owner (R. 123 at 51-52). He did not know who took it, and he never 
talked to Mr. Christofferson about the theft (R. 123 at 52). 
The owner of the compressor, Dale Mitchley, had several 
conversations with Mr. Christofferson concerning the theft. 
Mr. Christofferson on each occasion denied having taken the 
compressor (R. 123 at 21-22, 32 and 36). Mr. Mitchley gave no other 
evidence on the identity of the person who had stolen his property. 
The third witness was Detective Christenson, who testified as to 
Mr. Christofferson's April 7 statement (R. 123 at 59-60) and later 
retraction of that statement (R. 123 at 63). 
Without the April 7 statement, the State had no direct 
evidence that Mr. Christofferson was the perpetrator of the crime. 
Nothing contained in the circumstantial evidence from Ben Chapman 
created a greater likelihood that Mr. Christofferson had stolen the 
compressor rather than Mr. Chapman. The statement by 
Mr. Christofferson that he had taken the compressor was most likely 
the piece of evidence that swayed the jury. It cannot be said that 
the admission of that statement was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt and Mr. Christofferson's conviction should therefore be 
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reversed. 
POINT II. THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE 
THE CONTENTS OF A POLICE INVESTIGATION WAS 
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL TO MR. CHRISTOFFERSON. 
A. THE PROSECUTION VIOLATED ITS STATUTORY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO PROVIDE THIS EVIDENCE TO 
THE DEFENSE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(a) (1982) states in relevant 
part: 
the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon 
request the following material or information of 
which he has knowledge: 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, . . . 
(5) Any other item of evidence which 
the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the defendant in 
order for the defendant to adequately prepare 
his defense. 
Evidence of an exculpatory nature as requested under 
§ 77-35-16(a)(4) must be produced by the prosecutor, who also 
has a constitutional duty to volunteer obviously 
exculpatory evidence that creates a reasonable 
doubt of guilt. 
State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added). 
If information is requested under § 77-35-16(a)(5), 
disclosure is required only to the extent the court orders. 
However, when the prosecution chooses to respond 
voluntarily to a request under subsection (a)(5) 
without requiring the defense to obtain a court 
order, considerations of fairness require that the 
prosecution respond to the request in a manner 
that will not be misleading. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987). The Utah Supreme 
Court has imposed two requirements on the prosecution in such a 
situation. 
First, the prosecution either must produce all of 
the material requested or must identify explicitly 
those portions of the request with respect to 
which no responsive material will be provided. 
Second, when the prosecution agrees to produce any 
of the material requested, it must continue to 
disclose such material on an ongoing basis to the 
defense. 
I_d. at 916-17. 
[A]n incomplete response to a specific request not 
only deprives the defense of certain evidence, but 
has the effect of representing to the defense that 
the evidence does not exist. In reliance on this 
misleading representation, the defense might 
abandon lines of independent investigation, 
defenses, or trial strategies that it would 
otherwise have pursued. 
Id. at 917; quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 
(1985). Failure to supplement discovery responses also has the risk 
of 
so mislead[ing] the defendant as to cause 
prejudicial error. 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). 
Information that must be disclosed by the prosecution 
involves more than the actual knowledge of the prosecutor. In 
addition, any failure to disclose is not rendered harmless because 
the prosecutor in good faith was unaware of the information. 
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984). 
Information known to the police officers working 
on a case is charged to the prosecution since the 
officers are part of the prosecution team. 
Id, (citations omitted). Thus, the prosecutor has an obligation "to 
search beyond his own file cabinet," Knight, 734 P.2d at 918, and 
inquire as to the information known to his investigating officers. 
In the present case, Mr. Christofferson requested in part 
1. All police reports and investigations (R. 13), 
and 
4. All evidence tending to negate the guilt of 
the defendant (R. 14). 
See Motion for Discovery contained in Addendum C. The prosecutor in 
reply voluntarily offered the Information and a police report 
(R. 15). Subsequent to this reply, Mr. Christofferson had another 
conversation with Detective Christenson, the investigating officer 
in the compressor case (R. 123 at 62-63). The contents of this 
conversation were not communicated to the prosecutor until the day 
of trial (R. 123 at 62-64, 78). At trial, the detective 
characterized Mr. Christofferson1s statement as a denial of guilt 
(R. 123 at 64). The detective also claimed that Mr. Christofferson 
implicated another person, Mr. Larson, in the theft (R. 123 at 64). 
In addition, the detective testified that he used information 
obtained from that conversation to obtain a search warrant (R. 123 
at 63). Mr. Christofferson claimed he never changed his story 
(R. 123 at 87). 
The second statement was exculpatory evidence since it 
implicated another person and retracted the earlier inculpatory 
statement. The State therefore had an absolute duty to disclose 
this information. 
Furthermore, even if this evidence were not considered 
exculpatory information, it still falls squarely within the request 
for police reports and investigations as requested under 
§ 77-35-16(c)(5). These materials must be information known to the 
police but need not be contained in written reports. See Shabata, 
678 P.2d 785, 788. 
The State had a continuing obligation to present this 
information to the defense. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(b) (1953 
as amended); Knight, 734 P.2 at 916-17 (there is a continuing 
obligation for the State "to disclose material falling within the 
scope of the agreement to produce . . . " ) ; Workman, 635 P.2d at 52 
("the constitutional right of the defendant to a fair trial compels 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence material to the preparation of 
his case"). 
The State's somewhat creative "Answer to Defendant's 
Request for Discovery" (R. 15) (see Addendum D) does not relieve it 
of this continuing obligation to inform defense counsel. First, the 
State voluntarily complied with Defendant's request in point 1 of 
the Discovery Motion and, under Knight, cannot thereafter limit the 
response to the single report. Second, the exculpatory nature of 
this information required disclosure. Finally, the response itself 
is ambiguous. Although the statement "[t]he defendant's general 
request for discovery is denied . . . " suggests that the State is 
attempting to limit its responsibility to provide discovery, the 
parameters of that limitation are not clear. Having received a 
police report outlining a statement by Mr. Christofferson indicating 
that he took the compressor, defense counsel would reasonably expect 
to receive information of any evidence of a recantation of that 
statement. 
It is immaterial that Mr. Christofferson was aware that a 
conversation occurred between himself and Detective Christenson 
since Appellant was not aware of the characterization of the 
conversation by the State. It is incorrect to presume the officer's 
testimony to be true and, therefore, to presume that 
Mr. Christofferson held the same impression of the conversation as 
the officer. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 922. 
In Knight, the defendant was held not to know the 
contents of the testimony of a former alibi witness turned State's 
witness. Denial of the duty to disclose the witness' statement by 
the trial court presumed that the witness' testimony was the truth, 
but in reality 
the defense had no way of knowing what she would 
say and could not prepare to meet it. 
Knight, 734 P.2d at 922. Similarly, the lack of disclosure 
concerning the conversation misled the defendant into thinking 
nothing occurred in that conversation that required a different 
trial tactic or an effort to rebut or explain the characterization. 
At trial, Mr. Christofferson's defense revolved around 
his belief that he had a right to take the compressor. This defense 
took into account and explained the initial statement. However, the 
second, undisclosed statement during which the State claimed he 
retracted the April 7 statement was not explained by this defense. 
Furthermore, the second, undisclosed statement significantly damaged 
Mr. Christofferson's credibility since it suggested that he had 
changed his story in the course of the investigation. 
Although defense counsel attempted to salvage the defense 
through cross-examination of the detective, 
The fact that defense counsel conducted vigorous 
cross-examination is not proof that [he] was fully 
prepared to meet [this] testimony. 
Knight, 734 P.2d at 922. Counsel was not able to formulate the most 
appropriate trial strategy and to completely prepare for 
cross-examination because he did not know of the existence of this 
information. The crux of the State's case was the April 7 
statement, and any harm to Mr. Christofferson's credibility needed 
to be dealt with by his counsel through adequate pretrial 
preparation. 
Although the exact point in the proceedings at which the 
prosecutor became aware of the second statement is not clear, it is 
clear that he knew about it on the morning of trial, prior to 
placing Detective Christenson on the stand (R. 123 at 78). See 
Addendum E for transcript of argument and ruling on this issue. 
MR. WALSH: Judge, I knew before he testified. I 
knew this morning when we were talking about it. 
I want you to understand. I didn't hear it for 
the first time there. My recollection is I heard 
it for the first time today when we were talking 
about it. 
Id. A review of the morning portions of the trial record, when read 
in conjunction with the prosecutor's acknowledgement that he learned 
about the second statement during the morning of the first day of 
trial, establishes that the prosecutor learned about the second 
statement prior to opening statements. 
The lunch break appears at R. 123 at 18. From the 
beginning of opening arguments until the lunch break, no other 
breaks were taken. Hence, the State was aware of the second 
statement and aware that it was information which had not been 
disclosed to the defense (Prosecutor: "I learned myself today about 
that." R. 123 at 77) prior to defense counsel's opening argument. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(b) requires the State to make 
disclosures as soon as practicable after filing charges. In this 
case, the prosecutor had a continuing obligation to disclose the 
information to defense counsel as soon as possible after learning 
it. During the period before trial in which he was speaking with 
Detective Christenson, the prosecutor was under an obligation to 
inform defense counsel as to police investigations. The prosecutor 
was aware that he had just learned the information and should have 
immediately informed defense counsel before court resumed session. 
Had the prosecutor informed defense counsel prior to 
opening arguments, defense counsel would have been in a position to 
ask for a continuance so as to reevaluate his case before the 
damaging testimony was admitted. Furthermore, defense counsel would 
have altered his opening argument to take the second statement into 
accounts. 
In addition, the State had the opportunity to inform 
defense counsel during the lunch break (R. 123 at 18). At that 
point, only a small portion of the testimony of the first witness 
had been elicited (Id.). Had defense counsel learned of the 
information during the break, he would have been able to discuss the 
statement with his client or otherwise prepare during the lunch 
break and would have been aware of the information when he 
cross-examined the State's other witnesses. The State violated 
Rule 16 by failing to make a timely disclosure. 
The State's violation of § 77-35-16 made adequate 
preparation impossible. The information was known to the 
investigating officer on the case. Any statement admitting or 
denying guilt was material to the issues since the case revolved 
around the April 7 statement in which Mr. Christofferson admitted 
taking the compressor and Mr. Christofferson1s credibility. The 
reply to the discovery request showed that police reports or 
investigations as a category had voluntarily been supplied; the 
continuing duty to provide further reports in this category was 
violated when the information concerning the conversation was never 
disclosed. Mr. Christofferson was misled by this limited reply 
followed by the prosecution's failure to supplement its response. 
B. MR. CHRISTOFFERSON REQUESTED RELIEF AS SOON AS 
THE DISCOVERY VIOLATION BECAME APPARENT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(g) (1982) provides further that: 
if at any time during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the 
court that a party has failed to comply with this 
rule, the court may order such party to permit the 
discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or 
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not 
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it 
deems just under the circumstances. 
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Thus, it is within the trial court's power to fashion a remedy that 
removes any threat of prejudice caused to the defendant by the 
discovery violation. Knight, 734 P.2d at 918. The trial court has 
this power as soon as the matter is brought to its attention. If 
the requested relief is denied or no suitable relief is fashioned, 
an abuse of discretion may have been committed, jld. Such abuse 
occurs when the relief requested would have "obviated this 
prejudice," but such relief was refused and the relief granted was 
inadequate to protect the substantial rights of the defendant. Id. 
at 918-19. 
At trial, Mr. Christofferson objected to the testimony of 
Detective Christenson based on the violation of discovery rules and 
made a motion to dismiss (R. 123 at 77). The motion was denied, and 
the court made no other effort to obviate the prejudice by 
fashioning what it deemed to be more suitable relief (R. 123 at 
78-79). The dismissal would, of course, protect 
Mr. Christofferson's right to a fair trial. However, if the trial 
court felt this relief was too harsh, it was free under subsection 
(g) of 77-35-16 to fashion the more appropriate—and obvious—relief 
of a mistrial.2 A mistrial could have been granted at this point 
without prejudicing the State, and this could have protected 
Mr. Christofferson. The trial court declined to act in granting 
relief once the discovery violation had been brought to its 
attention and relief had been requested, thereby abusing its 
discretion. 
C. THE DENIAL OF RELIEF FOR THE BREACH OF 
DISCOVERY CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
For an error to require reversal, the likelihood 
of a different outcome must be sufficiently high 
to undermine confidence in the verdict. 
Knight, 734 P.2d at 920. A "sufficiently high" likelihood is higher 
than a "mere possibility" that the outcome would be different but is 
substantially lower than "more probable than not" that the outcome 
would be different. Id. 
2
 The circumstances in this case are distinguishable from 
those in State v. Larson, 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (filed June 1, 
1989). In Larson, prior to trial, the trial judge indicated he 
would consider a request to continue the trial if defense counsel 
believed a continuance was needed to subpoena the witnesses in 
question. Defense counsel made no such motion. In the instant 
case, defense counsel first became aware of the statement when the 
evidence was admitted during the testimony of the State's final 
witness. Defense counsel had already presented his opening 
argument, during which he acknowledged that Mr. Christofferson took 
the compressor and also acknowledged that Appellant told Detective 
Christenson that he had taken it (R. 123 at 6-7). Defense counsel 
had already cross-examined the State's other witnesses and prepared 
his case. Defense counsel did not become aware of this information 
prior to trial, as was the case in Larson, and a continuance would 
not have undone the harm caused by lack of information as to the 
second statement. Nor did the trial judge suggest a continuance as 
a possible remedy, as the trial judge in Larson had done. 
[I]t is up to the State to persuade the court that 
there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the 
error, the outcome of the trial would have been 
16. at 921. 
The basis of the State's case was the April 7 statement 
admitted over vigorous defense objection. Any defense available to 
Mr. Christofferson had to rely in great part on his credibility and 
on his explanation for that statement. 
Appellant's defense was greatly impaired by surprise 
testimony that Mr. Christofferson had, according to the police, 
given a substantially different statement to the investigating 
officer during the course of the investigation. Mr. Christofferson 
was unable to fashion an overall strategy in coping with the double 
attack of a damaging statement and a belatedly revealed retraction 
of that statement. His lawyer was also unable to adequately prepare 
to cross-examine the officer, whose testimony undoubtedly carried a 
great deal of weight with the jury. There was no testimony, other 
than that of Detective Christenson, that tied Mr. Christofferson to 
the crime. Such lack creates a great likelihood that absent the 
error Mr. Christofferson would not have been convicted. Knight, 734 
P.2d at 922-23. The State cannot meet its burden to show that 
absent the error there was no reasonable likelihood the outcome of 
the trial would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, 
Appellant/Defendant, WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this case for a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this /2- d^uof June, 1989. 
*ADSMAW 
Attorney for Defend^fe^Appellant 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this /^-day of June, 1989. 
c 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by 
this day of June, 1989. 
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JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
430 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. CR88-768 
JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON 
The defendant, WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, through his attorney 
of record, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, hereby moves this Court to suppress 
the statements made by the defendant, WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, on 
April 7, 1988. The defendant moves to suppress these statements for 
the reason that they were taken while he was in custody and after 
the defendant had invoked his constitutional right to have counsel 
appointed for him. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 40 CrL 2480 
(1987). 
DATED this 3^ day of June, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S cr'BRADSHAW ' 
rney for Defendant 
. s r~ —» r» 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
Please take notice that the above-entitled matter will be 
heard before the Honorable LEONARD H. RUSSON at his courtroom on the 
11th day of July, 1988, at the hour of 2:00 p.m. Please govern 
yourselves accordingly. 
3D this DATE
 V)C/ day of June, 1988. 
JAMES C.l BRADSHAW 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this day of June, 1988. 
JUN
 3 0 198* 
~> LOYOLA 
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ADDENDUM B 
FILED IN CLEP.K'G OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Lite:1, 
JUL 1 4 1983 
H Dixon Kindlgy Ck?rl; 2)1 C:ct Court 
j y <TQ ,^<6Lu/ndl^/Ls / 
Oouty C<fcrk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, : 
VS. : CASE NO. CR-88-768 
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, : 
Defendant. : 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on for hearing on July 
11, 1988, at which time testimony was received along with 
authorities relied upon by the parties, and the Court took the 
matter under advisement. The Court requested that counsel submit 
to the Court a transcript of the tape of the hearing before the 
Circuit Court, as well as the file in the case related to this 
matter. The Court has received the file, but not the transcript. 
However, based upon the files and testimony received, the Court 
can make its ruling without benefit of the transcript of the 
Circuit Court hearing. 
Defendant moves to suppress a statement he gave to the 
police concerning theft of a compressor while being interrogated 
concerning a burglary. He claims that his rights to legal 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment had been invoked, as well as 
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his rights to remain silent and to counsel under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
At the hearing, Officer Hutchison testified that he 
interviewed the defendant at the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in 
Salt Lake City on April 6, 1988, in regards to the burglary of a 
school that had occurred the day before. Defendant was read his 
Miranda rights, and answered questions concerning the school 
burglary. Towards the end of the interview he was asked if there 
were any other crimes he would like to clear up, and he stated 
that he knew who took an air compressor in an unrelated crime. 
Defendant was then booked. 
The following day, on April 7, 1988, Hutchison, with a 
Murray City Detective, again interviewed defendant. Again, his 
Miranda rights were read to him, and he was questioned concerning 
the theft of the air compressor. Hutchison testified that the 
defendant reported that he had been to court, that an attorney 
had been appointed for him in regards to the Edison school crime, 
but that he had not yet seen that attorney. Defendant further 
stated a willingness to answer questions concerning the 
compressor crime, and at no time did he invoke his Miranda rights 
to remain silent or to answer no further questions without advice 
of counsel. Detective Hutchison testified that defendant, at no 
time, invoked his Miranda rights, nor did he ask for legal 
counsel, or to refrain from answering questions until he had 
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consulted legal counsel. In fact, he testified of his 
willingness to talk without benefit of counsel. 
Defendant takes the position that once he had been appointed 
legal counsel, that he had rights that he could not waive in 
regards to further interrogation unless he initiated such 
interrogation. Defendant relies upon U.S. Ex Rel. Espinoza v. 
Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1987), and Arizona v. Roberson, 
an unpublished United States Supreme Court decision, decided June 
15, 1988. 
The law as stated in both decisions is applicable in the 
case before this Court. In U.S. Ex Rel. Espinoza v. Fairman. 
supra, the court stated: 
The Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment each 
provide a separate right to counsel in a criminal case. 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person. . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself. . ." Although the amendment itself 
does not speak of the right to counsel, the Supreme 
Court held in Miranda v. Arizona. . . that it provides 
"an individual held for interrogation. . . the right to 
consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him 
during interrogation. . . . " In addition, the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 
In the Espinoza case, Espinoza had been arrested on a 
weapons charge, and during interrogation of that crime was 
questioned concerning a murder. In regards to the weapons 
charge, he had invoked the right to counsel under the Sixth 
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Amendment. No such right was, or could have been made, in 
regards to the murder charge since the State had not yet filed 
charges «a*^ begun to prosecute him in that matter. The above 
court stated: 
Although Espinoza had no Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel in the murder case at the time of the police 
interrogation, it is clear that, as a suspect in police 
custody, he did have a Fifth Amendment right to be 
assisted by an attorney at the interrogation. However, 
Espinoza did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right at 
the interrogation. The only time at which he invoked 
his constitutional right to counsel was at his 
arraignment on the weapons charge, which occurred prior 
to the murder interrogation. We must therefore 
determine whether Espinozafs invocation of his right to 
counsel at his arraignment constituted an invocation of 
his Fifth Amendment right. If it did, we must next 
decide whether Espinoza!s Fifth Amendment invocation 
remained in effect at the subsequent police 
interrogation on the murder charge. If so, we must 
resolve whether Espinoza waived his Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel at the interrogation. 
We conclude that Espinoza invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel; that this invocation 
remained in effect because the custodial interrogation 
occurred while he remained in continuous police 
custody; and that because the State initiated the 
interrogation, Espinoza was incapable of waiving his 
right to counsel. We therefore conclude that the State 
violated Espinozafs Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
and that, as a result, his confession was inadmissible. 
This Court, likewise, holds that if, in fact, Christofferson 
had invoked his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment in 
regards to the burglary of the Edison school case, such right was 
his during the interrogation in this matter, not only of the 
Edison school case, but of the compressor theft case. The 
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interrogation occurred while he remained in continuous police 
custody, the State initiated the interrogation and, therefore, 
Christofferson could not waive his right to counsel without 
counsel being present. 
If Christofferson had not invoked his right to legal counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment, he still had his rights under the 
Fifth Amendment which could be waived. 
A review of State v. Christofferson, CR-88-652, the school 
burglary case, the Court file indicates that the Complaint was 
filed on April 8, 1988, and a Summons dated that date of the 
warrant of arrest. The defendant appeared without counsel for 
arraignment in Circuit Curt on April 11, 1988, at which time the 
court appointed the Legal Defenders office to represent the 
defendant. Attorney Bradshaw filed his appearance on April 12, 
1988, and the preliminary hearing held on April 13, 1988. 
Therefore, the interrogation by the Salt Lake City Police, 
as well as the Murray Police, apparently occurred prior to the 
Complaint being filed, and prior to defendant's appearance in 
court without counsel, at which time legal counsel was appointed. 
This being the case, and since the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel does not attach until the State begins its prosecution, 
and since the case involving theft of the compressor was not 
filed until April 13, 1988, the police had a right to question 
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Christofferson as long as he had been advised of his Miranda 
rights and he had effectively waived the same. 
Mr. Christofferson was given his Miranda rights, and did 
waive the same, and did voluntarily talk to the police concerning 
theft of the compressor. Therefore, such statement is 
admissible. 
The defendant's Motion to Suppress is, therefore, denied. 
The Court recognizes that the detective who interrogated the 
defendant testified that on April 7, the defendant informed him 
he had been to court and an attorney had been appointed who he 
had not yet seen. This could not have possibly happened, since 
the court records indicate clearly that neither case was filed at 
the time of or prior to April 7, and the defendant made no court 
appearance according to the files until April 11. The Court in 
this decision relies upon the accuracy of the official court 
files. If, in fact, the hearing had occurred prior to April 7, 
whether or not Christofferson invoked his Sixth Amendment rights 
would depend upon what was said at the hearing. If the defendant 
had stated that he did not have an attorney and requested that 
one be appointed, that would constitute an invocation of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. If the defendant made no 
request for counsel, and the Court noting he did not have one 
simply appointed the Legal Defenders Office to represent him 
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that, in this Courtfs view, would not constitute an invocation of 
the Sixth Amendment right.to counsel. 
Dated this / ay of July, 1988. 
NARD H. RUS&&T 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DiXOM KiNSL:;"-
,v ~C XAtJsn rLU,US 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Ruling on Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid, to 
the following, this /4 day of July, 1988: 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James C. Bradshaw 
Attorney for Defendant 
430 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM C 
KAREN STAM 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE 
Plaintiff : RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
v. : 
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, : Case No. 881003172FS 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the defendant, WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON , through 
his attorney, KAREN STAM, and requests the following material be 
provided to her as discovery no later than three days prior to the 
preliminary hearing now set for the 27th day of April, 1988. 
To-wit: 
1. All police reports and investigations concerning the 
above-entitled case; 
2. All written or recorded statements of the defendant and 
co-defendant(s), if any; 
3. The criminal record of the defendant or felony 
convictions of any witnesses to be called by the prosecution; 
. f r* <? 1 
4. All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the 
defendant; 
5. All evidence tending to mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant; 
6. All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; 
7e< All physical evidence taken and all investigative 
analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case. 
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-26(5)(b), the State 
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following 
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to 
plead. z 
DATED this [2 day of April, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ttorney for Defendant </ 
KARE 
A
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Request to the Office of 
the County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Suite #S3700, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84190-1200, this /a —;day of April, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM D 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: DAVID S. WALSH 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, Room #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY 
Case No. 881003172 FS 
The defendant's general request for discovery is denied in 
accordance with State v. Knight, 734P. 2d 913 (Utah 1987), and 
pursuant to Section 77-35-16 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
the prosecution provides copies of the following documents in its 
prosecution file: 
1. A copy of the police report. 
2. A copy of the State's Information. 
DATED this &b^ dav of April, 1988. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
DAVID S. WALSH ~ V 
Deputy County Attorney 
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1 J MR* WALSH: I suspect whatever the entry is is 
2 J down in microfiche. 
3 I THE COURT: That is your job, you are the 
4 I prosecutor. It is your job to present the evidence to 
5 I the Court. I will so rule that before the prosecutor 
3 1 can cross examine on these prior crimes, that he must have 
7 i an^in hand sufficient evidence of the convictions. 
8 ] Certainly the Court file, the original Court file that 
9 I has within it a conviction or a certified copy of that 
conviction. Any other questions for the Court? 
MR. BRADSHAW: Your Honor, I also wanted the 
benefit of the record to indicate my position to dismiss 
3 , and that would be based on the failure of the State to 
14 I provide exculpatory evidence. The statement of 
15 I Christofferson, apparently my client made an exculpatory 
16 I statement that he did not commit the offense. As the 
1? I Court, I think can see from the State's evidence, the case 
18 I rests and falls, the evidence is based upon my client's 
19 J statement. The fact that he made an exculpatory statement 
20 I that retracted his earlier statement, I think it clearly 
21 I should have been provided to me and I submit under 
22 J Brady vs. Maryland, the failure to provide the exculpatory 
23 I evidence should warrant dismissal. 
2* I MR. WALSH: Judge, I learned myself today about 
25
 I that. I believe when we had the prior hearing the officer 
77 
testified he made a similar statement to hinu Mr. Bradshaw 
has been aware since that earlier hearing that 
Mr. Christofferson has changed positions on this in his 
involvement in this case from the beginning. I was not 
aware of that until today myself, and so to say this case 
should be dismissed for that reason is asking a lot for 
something that there has been no violation of, Judge. 
I don't see that there has been any violation whatsoever. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bradshaw, anything further? 
MR. BRADSHAW: I would submit it, Your Honor, 
and to clear up the record that there was no indication 
at the Preliminary Hearing of that statement. 
THE COURT: The motion is denied. Apparently, 
this was information that was not contained in any of the 
investigative reports or in the mind of the prosecutor, 
he himself, did not know about it until today. Apparently, 
this was some information that came out during examination 
of the officer. I am going to rule that the law has not 
been violated in this regard and the motion is denied. 
MR. WALSH: Judge, I knew before he testified. 
I knew this morning when we were talking about it. I 
want you to understand. I didn't hear it for the first 
time there. My recollection is I heard it for the first 
time today when we were talking about it. 
THE COURT: My ruling remains the same and let 
78 
the record so show. Okay, bring in the jury. 
(Jury returned to the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Let the record show the jury has 
returned. Occasionally, ladies and gentlemen, we have 
matters.that come up that take a lot of time and we 
appreciate your patience, and now you are back with us. 
We can continue on. You may continue. 
MR. WALSH: Judge, the State rests. 
THE COURT: The State rests. Mr. Bradshaw. 
MR. BRADSHAW: Thank you, Your Honor. We 
would call Bill Christofferson to the stand. 
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON 
Called as a witness on his own behalf, after having been 
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BRADSHAW: 
Q Bill, could you please tell us your full name. 
A My name is William C. Christofferson. 
Q You go by Bill? 
A Yeah. 
Q Where do you presently live? 
A I am at ATC right now, is AL's Treatment Center. 
Q How long have you been there? 
A About two and a half weeks. 
Q During 1987 and 1988, did you live with 
